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NOTES
INSIDER LOANS: HOW RESTRICTED IS
THE BANKER?
I. Introduction
A vigorous campaign to ensure the safe and efficient operation of
the American banking system, initiated by bank regulators and
members of Congress, led to the enactment of the Financial In-
stitutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978
("FIRA").1 This package of bank reform legislation imposed
stricter controls on insider lending transactions which Congress
had seen as one of the primary threats to the successful operations
of banks.' A major obstacle to the effective implementation of
these insider lending regulations was the nature of our dual bank-
ing system.a American banks have the option of becoming federally
chartered or state chartered. Although federally chartered banks
("national banks") have the option of becoming members of both
the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC"), these banks are subject to federal banking
laws and regulations by virtue of their charter.4 State chartered
banks, on the other hand, are not subject to any federal banking
provisions, unless they become a member of the Federal Reserve
System ("member bank"), or insure their deposits with the
FDIC.6
While prior to FIRA, member banks were subject to limited fed-
eral supervision concerning insider loans,7 state chartered non-
member banks even if insured by the FDIC, were not as closely
1. Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (codified at scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as FIRA].
2. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1383, 5th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 9273, 9275, 9367 [hereinafter cited as [1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws ].
3. Id. at 9280-83.
4. Id. at 9283.
5. See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 96(5) (McKinney 1976).
6. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 32 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
7. See, e.g., Act of July 3, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-44, 81 Stat. 109 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
375a (Supp. 1980) (loans to an executive officer of a bank)).
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governed by federal regulation respecting insider loans.8 The ab-
sence of effective statutory restrictions on insider loans precipi-
tated numerous abuses. FIRA was enacted to eliminate abuses that
were revealed to Congress in several reports from the FDIC which
demonstrated that excessive insider lending was a major cause of
bank failures.9 These abuses involved loans to insiders which were
not only excessive in amount but were also granted on substan-
tially more favorable terms than those available to the public.10
Participation in such unsafe and unsound bank practices was
shown to Congress to be significant." The FDIC, for example, de-
termined that almost sixty percent of all bank failures between
1960 and 1975 were principally caused by insider lending abuses."2
In addition, the reports disclosed that eighty percent of all bank
failures between 1970 and 1975 were state chartered institutions,
the majority of which were not member banks"' and thus were not
subject to adequate federal regulatory supervision.0 Thus, to in-
sure the sound operation of the majority of American banks,", the
FDIC argued that permissive extensions of credit to bank insiders
had to be eliminated and replaced by a well delineated system of
laws and regulations applicable to member banks and state
chartered nonmember banks insured by the FDIC."
8. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at 9283.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 9282.
11. Id. at 9283.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Member banks are state chartered banks which join the Federal Reserve System and
are thereby governed by the Federal Reserve Board in addition to their individual state
regulatory agency. 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(g) (Regulation 0, Loans to Executive Officers, Directors
and Principal Shareholders of Member Banks) (amended Dec. 31, 1979).
15. [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS, supra note 2, at 9283. The committee which
made this study found that the state laws governing insider lending limits were very differ-
ent. This prompted Congress to bring all state-insured nonmember banks under some regu-
latory control with respect to insider lending practices.
16. Although this Note concentrates on American owned banks, it is important to note
that foreign banks fall within the ambit of certain provisions discussed herein. International
Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 618 (Sept. 17, 1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(r)(1) (Supp. 11 1978)). See generally notes 132-46 infra for a discussion of the appli-
cable provisions.
17. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2 at 9283. Prior to FIRA, the FDIC
had little power to control insider abuses of state chartered insured banks, and unless these
banks were members of the Federal Reserve System, no federal agency had the authority to
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Prior to the enactment of FIRA, public interest was particularly
aroused by the media's coverage of the banking practices of former
Office of Management & Budget Director Bert Lance.'8 The
"Lance Affair" in conjunction with publicity of several major bank
failures" during the 1970's made the reality of insider abuses
widely known. 0 Some members of the banking community also
recognized that insider lending practices had been abusive and ex-
pressed concern over the detrimental consequences of such
dealings.'
FIRA provides the safeguards necessary to control bank insider
abuses by imposing specific lending limitations and mandatory re-
porting requirements on certain loans to bank directors, executive
officers and principal shareholders which apply to member banks
and state nonmember insured banks.22 The credit restrictions and
reporting requirements mandated by FIRA, not only apply to in-
house loans, but also to correspondent bank loans to bank execu-
tives as well.28 In addition, FIRA expands the civil penalties im-
posed on banks and bank executive officers and directors who vio-
late its provisions, affording the regulators substantially increased
supervisory control.24 The criminal sanctions previously imposed
for such violations remain in effect.2
5
The courts, the banking community and the general public need
govern their insider lending practices. See also Buchalter & Allen, Bank Insider Abuses:
When Does the Ax Fall?, 96 BANKINO L.J. 804, 805-06 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bank
Insider Abuses].
18. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at 9281. Congress was particu-
larly interested in the correspondent loan and overdraft practices of Mr. Lance, who was the
past president of the Calhoun National Bank in Georgia. Mr. Lance has been acquitted of
the criminal charges brought against him in relation to these insider practices.
19. Id. at 9280-81. Some major bank failures where excessive insider abuses played a
major role were: 1) U.S. National Bank of San Diego, a one billion dollar bank which failed
in 1973; 2) Franklin National Bank, a five billion dollar bank which failed in 1974; and 3)
Hamilton National Bank of Chattanooga, one of the largest interstate bank holding compa-
nies, which failed in 1975.
20. Id. at 9281.
21. Id. at 9279-80. For example, loan officers of several American banks testified that
they felt compelled in the absence of any regulation to the contrary, to make loans to bank
insiders, even though they knew that the loans were not in the best interest of the bank.
22. 12 U.S.C. §§ 375a and 375b (Supp. 1980).
23. Id. § 1972(2)(c) (Supp. II 1978).
24. Id. § 1818(i)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1976).
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to comprehend fully the impact FIRA has on the banking industry
in order to closely monitor the insider practices of banks, and pre-
vent insider abuses in the future." Section II of this Note will dis-
cuss the laws and regulations17 instituted by FIRA which specifi-
cally govern loans to bank insiders, and other federal laws affecting
this issue. The effectiveness and practicality of these laws and reg-
ulations will be analyzed. Because the banking industry operates
under the auspices of a dual regulatory system, 8 section III will
discuss the effectiveness of state control over insider lending prac-
tices. The New York State Banking Law29 will be analyzed to de-
termine the impact state law has on insider abuses, and will be
compared to the federal regulations concerning insider abuses.
II. Federal Regulation
A. Limitations on Extensions of Credit to Bank Insiders
1. Scope of Legislation
A principal factor contributing to the extensive participation in
insider lending abuses was the absence of a statutory definition of
"insider" or "extension of credit."30 Prior to FIRA, many bank in-
siders were able to secure preferential and excessive extensions of
credit because neither the individual nor his monetary advance fell
within the ambit of a statutory definition and thereby remained
free from regulation.3 ' In order to promote a safe and efficient
banking system, by eliminating as many insider abuses as possible,
a comprehensive definition of insider was essential.3 ' Thus, the
Federal Reserve Board, pursuant to the power vested in it by
FIRA, amended Regulation 0ss which clarifies the scope of the
26. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1980, at A14, col. 1 (where it was revealed that insider
influence allegedly enabled directors of the National Bank of Washington to obtain loans for
their friends amounting to at least four and one half million dollars).
27. The principal regulation discussed herein is Regulation 0, 12 C.F.R. § 215 (amended
December 31, 1979).
28. See notes 3-6 supra and accompanying text.
29. N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 1-9081 (McKinney 1976).
30. Guenter, The Lance Legacy-Title VIII of the Financial Institutions Regulatory
and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, 96 BANKING L.J. 292, 296 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
The Lance Legacy]. See also [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, supra note 2, at 9278.
31. [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nows, supra note 2, at 9282.
32. The Lance Legacy, supra note 30, at 296.
33. 12 C.F.R. § 215 (amended Dec. 31, 1979). These definitions are applicable to mem-
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FIRA provisions governing insider lending practices to include def-
initional guidelines which eliminate any ambiguity which previ-
ously engulfed the terms "insider" and "extension of credit." 4
As a general rule, an insider is a member of the upper strata of
bank management, namely, directors, executive officers and prin-
cipal shareholders." Whereas every bank employee may techni-
cally fall within the generic definition of an insider, each employee
is not a potential threat to the security of a banking institution
where extensions of credit are concerned. 3 Generally, lower-level
bank employees are not afforded free accessibility to credit. There-
fore, Congress and bank regulators are not primarily interested in
regulating the borrowing practices of every bank employee. Rather,
they are concerned with regulating loans to those insiders who may
obtain preferential and excessive credit extensions, for either
themselves or their families, friends or business interests, which
may threaten the financial security of a bank .3  The term insider
also includes not only those who fall within the general rule, but
also includes those who are technically outside the perimeters of
bank management, such as a director or principal shareholder of a
bank related in interest to the lending bank, or a subsidiary
thereof.
The first category of insiders which FIRA regulates is directors.
The term director under Regulation 0 includes not only directors
of member banks,"8 but also directors of a bank holding company "
of which the member bank is a subsidiary" and each director of
ber and state insured nonmember banks. The Federal Reserve Board was vested with the
power to implement these regulations pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §§ 248(i), 375a(10), 375b(7),
1817(K)(3), 1972(2)(F)(vi) (Supp. 11 1978).
34. Bank Insider Abuses, supra note 17, at 807.
35. 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(c), .2(d), .2(j) (1980).
36. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2. This report does not mention any
bank personnel except directors, executive officers and principal shareholders.
37. Bank Insider Abuses, supra note 17, at 807.
38. See note 14 supra.
39. A bank holding company is any company which controls a bank. Control encom-
passes: the power to vote more than 25% of all voting shares; power over the election of a
majority of directors; or influence on major policymaking decisions. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1)
(Supp. 11 1978); 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(b)(l)(i)-.2(b)(1)(iii) (1980).
40. A subsidiary is any company, 25% or more of whose shares are directly or indirectly
controlled or owned by a bank holding company, or any company whose election of the
board of directors is controlled by the bank holding company, or any company whose policy
decisions are influenced by a bank holding company. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(d) (Supp. 11 1978). A
1980]
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any other subsidiary of that bank holding company."' An advisory
director of either a member bank, a bank holding company with a
member bank subsidiary or another subsidiary of that bank hold-
ing company, is considered a director unless his sole responsibility
is to give advice.42
Second, pursuant to Regulation 0, any individual is considered
to be an executive officer if he engages in or has the authority to
engage in the major policymaking decisions of the bank.4 8 Further,
an executive officer includes: the chairman of the board, the presi-
dent, the secretary, the treasurer, the cashier, and every vice presi-
dent of a member bank regardless of whether he participates in
major policymaking decisions." However, if a resolution of the
board or a provision in the bank's bylaws specifically excludes the
officer from participating in major policymaking decisions of the
bank, he is not considered an executive officer.4 5 This definition
reflects congressional intent to curb all possible insider abuses by
expanding the term executive officer to include any individual in a
policymaking position, who realistically has the influence to secure
preferential and excessive credit extensions.
Third, a principal shareholder46 is any individual or company 41
which directly or indirectly controls, owns or has the power to vote
more than ten percent48 of any class of voting securities of a mem-
subsidiary of a member bank is excluded from this definition. 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(L) (1980).
41. 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(c) (1980).
42. Id. The advisory director may not be voted into office by the bank's shareholders and
must be prohibited from participating in voting on matters before the board in order to
maintain his non-director status under Regulation 0. Id.
43. Id. § 215.2(d). Executive officers do not include individuals who have a title, but
exercise limited discretion and who do not participate in major policymaking decisions. Id. §
215.2(d) n.1.
44. Id. § 215.2(d).
45. Id. Such factors as whether the officer has an official title, whether it designates him
an officer or assistant, or whether he serves with compensation, are not essential in deter-
mining that individual's participation in major policymaking decisions. Id.
46. Id. § 215.2(j).
47. Company includes any business entity which is not an insured bank or a corporation
whose majority of shares are owned by the United States or any state. Id. § 215.2(a). See 12
U.S.C. § 375b(6)(B) (Supp. 1980).
48. If the member bank is located in a city, town or village with a population of less than




ber bank.4" In calculating this ten percent ceiling, any shares held
by the immediate family 0 of an individual shareholder are consid-
ered to be held by that individual." Although this definition en-
compasses a major class of insiders, it fails to include shareholders
who may not own ten percent of the voting securities of a bank,
but who may by virtue of their holdings exercise tremendous influ-
ence over major policymaking decisions. If the purpose of FIRA is
to curb insider lending abuses, any shareholder in a position to ex-
ert significant influence over major policy decisions should be in-
cluded within the definition of insider regardless of the exact per-
centage of his holdings. This will ensure that all insiders capable of
securing preferential and excessive loans will be governed by fed-
eral regulations.
In view of the fact that certain monetary advances to insiders
were not regarded as "extensions of credit," but rather were viewed
as privileges which inured to those occupying high-level positions
in the bank,52 Regulation 0 eliminated these practices by including
within the familiar meaning of the term "extension of credit" a
broad range of monetary transactions.53 The term "extension of
credit" includes not only the making or the renewal of a loan or
the granting of a line of credit,' but also encompasses any transac-
tion whereby an individual becomes obligated, either directly or
indirectly, to pay a bank money.55 Examples of such transactions
include: an overdraft advance," a purchase under a repurchase
agreement of securities,57 the issuance of a standby letter of
credit,58 an increase of an existing indebtedness, 59 and an advance
49. Id.
50. The term "immediate family" includes the individual's spouse, minor children and
any of the individual's adult children residing at home. Id. § 215.2(e).
51. Id. § 215.2(j).
52. See note 20 supra.
53. 12 C.F.R. § 215.3(a) (1980).
54. Id. A line of credit under $5,000.00, granted pursuant to an agreement with a bank
whereby the bank acquires charge or time credit accounts or makes payments pursuant to a
credit card or preauthorized overdraft checking, is not an extension of credit provided it is
not made on preferential terms and prior approval is not required. Id. § 215.3(b)(5).
55. Id. § 215.3(a)(8).
56. Id. § 215.3(a)(2). See notes 83-87 infra and accompanying text.
57. 12 C.F.R. § 215.3(a)(1).
58. Id. § 215.3(a)(3).
59. Id. § 215.3(a)(6). This does not include funds if they are "advanced by the bank for
its own protection for (i) accrued interest or (ii) taxes, insurance or other expenses which are
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of unearned compensation." Any method by which credit is ex-
tended to an insider is governed by these provisions,6' thereby
bringing the majority of monetary transactions between banks and
their insiders within the confines of some regulatory control.
2. General Restrictions
The objective in enacting FIRA and issuing Regulation 0 was
substantially to limit the granting of preferential loans to bank in-
siders.6 2 To achieve this goal, Congress and the Federal Reserve
Board imposed specific limitations on credit terms, aggregate lend-
ing limits, overdrafts and correspondent loans available to insid-
ers.63 A careful analysis of these limitations reveals, however, that
officers, directors and principal shareholders, as defined by Regula-
tion 0, are not subject to these restraints on an equal basis."4
(a) Credit Terms
All member banks and state insured nonmember banks are pro-
hibited from extending credit to an executive officer, principal
shareholder or director, unless they do so on substantially the
same terms as those prevalent at the time for similar transac-
tions.6 5 In addition, when a bank extends credit to any insider, it
must not assume a risk greater than that which the bank would be
willing to assume in granting a loan to a disinterested party.66 In
addition, before a member bank may extend credit to an executive
officer, the officer is required to make the following disclosures.
First, an executive officer must inform the bank's board of direc-
tors that he has been extended credit."' Second, he must file a cur-
incidental to the existing indebtedness." Id.
60. Id. § 215.3(a)(7). An extension of credit, however, does not include any "advance
against accrued salary or other accrued compensation, for a period in excess of thirty days
or an advance for the payment of authorized travel or other expenses incurred or to be
incurred on behalf of the bank." Id. § 215.3(b)(1).
61. Id. § 215.3(a)(8).
62. See Bank Insider Abuses, supra note 17, at 809-10.
63. 12 U.S.C. §§ 375a, 375b (Supp. 1980).
64. See notes 38-51 supra and accompanying text.
65. 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(a) (1980). See 12 U.S.C. §§ 375a(1)(A)-(B), 1828(j)(2) (Supp. II
1978).
66. 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(a) (1980).
67. Id. § 215.5(d). See 12 U.S.C. § 375a(1)(C)-(D) (Supp. 1980).
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rent financial statement with the board of directors.0 8 The exemp-
tion of directors and principal shareholders of member banks,
executive officers of a bank holding company which has the mem-
ber bank as a subsidiary, and executive officers of any other sub-
sidiary of that bank holding company from these two require-
ments, 9 is contrary to the purpose of FIRA. If Congress in
enacting FIRA had intended to place all insiders on an equal basis
with nonbank borrowers, 70 then each insider as defined by Regula-
tion 0 should be required to report extensions of credit to his
board of directors and file a current financial report. These addi-
tional requirements would provide a bank with the added informa-
tion necessary to monitor closely its insider lending practices and
prevent potential abuses.
(b) Lending Limits
As a general rule, FIRA and Regulation 0 prohibit member
banks and state-insured nonmember banks from extending credit
to any insider in an amount which, when aggregated with all other
extensions of credit granted to that individual, exceeds $25,000. 71
In addition, no executive officer or principal shareholder or a re-
lated interest 72 thereof may be extended credit if that credit, when
aggregated with credit extended previously, exceeds the individual
lending limit of ten percent of the bank's capital stock and
unimpaired surplus.73 This limitation does not apply to directors
unless they are also executive officers or principal shareholders.7
68. 12 C.F.R. § 215.5(d)(3) (1980). See 12 U.S.C. § 375a(1)(C) (Supp. 1980).
69. 12 C.F.R. § 215.5(a) n.4 (1980). These requirements are not imposed on nonmember
bank executive officers. Id. § 215.5.
70. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws, supra note 2, at 9282.
71. 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(b)(1) (1980). See also 12 U.S.C. §§ 375b(2), 1828(j)(2) (Supp. II
1978). Prior to issuing credit the sum must be approved of by the entire board of directors
and the interested party must refrain from participating in such a decision. Approval is not
required for an extension of credit which was approved within fourteen months of the date
of the credit extension. 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(b)(1)-4(b)(2) (1980). The term participation in-
cludes any indirect action or influence on the decision to extend credit. Id. § 215.4(b)(3).
72. A related interest includes any company, political or campaign committee the indi-
vidual controls, or the funds or services of which will benefit a person. 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(K)
(1980). See also 12 U.S.C. § 375b(2) (Supp. 1980).
73. 12 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(c), .2(f) (1980). See 12 U.S.C. § 84(1) (1976); Id. §§ 375b(1),
1828(j)(2) (Supp. II 1978). This limitation was originally only imposed on national banks.
74. 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) n.2 (1980). See 12 U.S.C. § 375b(1) (Supp. H 1978). See also
Barrett, The Comptroller's Shift to a Stronger Enforcement Posture: Self-Dealing and Un-
1980] 439
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This exemption only serves to exclude many directors from any
statutory controls governing lending limitations. Although exten-
sions of credit to directors which exceed $25,000 must be approved
by the board, in the absence of any additional limitations on credit
extensions to directors, a director might be able to assert sufficient
influence to gain approval of his loan.
FIRA retained the specific monetary limitations on various loans
imposed exclusively on executive directors of member banks by
prior legislation. 5 These limitations include: $60,000 outstanding
at any one time to finance the purchase, construction or repair of
an executive officer's residence;7 1 $20,000 outstanding at any one
time to finance the education of his children; 7 $10,000 outstanding
at any one time for general lending purposes; 78 and $10,000 out-
standing at any one time to a partnership in which the executive
officer is a partner.7 9 In addition, these credit extensions become
due and payable at the option of the bank at any time if the execu-
tive officer becomes indebted to any other banking institution in
excess of the specific monetary limitations.80 These monetary limi-
tations8 ' appear to be overly restrictive, especially in view of to-
day's high inflation, in that they can hamper executive officers
from engaging in accepted and necessary personal banking transac-
tions. On the other hand, directors and principal shareholders may
be extended any amount of credit as long as it is approved in ad-
vance by the board of directors and not made on preferential
terms.82 The legislative history of FIRA does not indicate the rea-
son for this discrepancy. Whereas board approval may be a suffi-
cient safeguard for loans to directors and principal shareholders, it
sound Banking Practices Are the Target, 94 BANKING L.J. 725, 737-38 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Self Dealing and Unsound Banking].
75. 12 U.S.C. § 375a(2)-(5) (Supp. 1980).
76. Id. § 375a(2). FIRA increased this amount from $30,000 to $60,000.
77. Id. § 375a(3). FIRA increased this amount from $10,000 to $20,000.
78. Id. § 375a(4). FIRA increased this amount from $5,000 to $10,000.
79. Id. § 375a(4)-(5). FIRA increased this amount from $5,000 to $10,000. A partnership
loan must be extended from the funds allocated for general extensions of credit. 12 U.S.C. §
375a(4) (Supp. 1980). In addition, if one or more partners are members of the same partner-
ship seeking credit, the full amount of credit extended is considered granted to each officer
of the bank who is a partner. Id. § 375a(5).
80. Id. § 375a(1)(D). See 12 C.F.R. § 215.5(d)(4) (1980).
81. See notes 76-79 supra and accompanying text.
82. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
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does not follow that they should be totally exempt from any mone-
tary limitations on their loans.
(c) Overdrafts
The overdraft has risen to a position of notoriety and special
concern to bank regulators in the past decade s because of the ease
with which an insider could use an overdraft as a means of ob-
taining credit. To alleviate this problem, FIRA imposes limitations
on directors and executive officers who overdraw their accounts."
An executive officer's or director's overdraft may only be honored
if it is paid pursuant to either: 1) a written agreement pre-author-
izing the transfer of funds from another account of the individual
to cover the overdraft; or, 2) a written agreement authorizing an
interest-bearing credit plan which specifies a method of repay-
ment.85 Regulation 0 exempts overdrafts of principal shareholders
and any related interests of directors and executive officers from
these limitations." This exemption runs contrary to congressional
intent to curtail the use of the overdraft as an easy and uncon-
trolled method of insider credit extensions.87
(d) Correspondent Bank Loans
A correspondent loan to an insider is an extension of credit
granted by a bank which either maintains a correspondent account
with the insider's bank as a depositor or retains funds of the in-
sider's bank as a depository.88 This relationship has enabled many
insiders to obtain preferential and excessive credit extensions from
a correspondent bank.89 Although preferential credit extensions to
insiders by correspondent banks was a prevalent practice prior to
FIRA,e0 federal law did not restrict these transactions. Congress,
83. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at 9284.
84. 12 U.S.C. § 375a (Supp. 1980).
85. 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(d) (1980). Banks in general are permitted to honor overdrafts pur-
suant to the power vested in them by the Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 4-401(1)
(1978). An inadvertant overdraft by an insider in an amount less than $1,000 which is repaid
within three business days, is not considered an extension of credit for the purpose of this
legislation. 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(d) (1980).
86. 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(d) n.3 (1980).
87. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at 9284.
88. 12 C.F.R. § 215 (Regulation 0) (amended Dec. 31, 1979).
89. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at 9285.
90. Id.
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cognizant of these abuses included in FIRA provisions prohibiting
member banks and state insured nonmember banks which main-
tain correspondent accounts91 with other banks from extending
preferential credit to a director, executive officer or principal
shareholder of the correspondent bank.2 These prohibitions and
reporting requirements mandated by FIRA curtail this type of in-
sider abuse which had previously plagued the banking industry."
B. Reporting Requirements
In the past, bank regulators found it difficult to effectively su-
pervise insider credit extensions because there was no unified and
detailed reporting system through which regulators could learn of
all transactions." A central reporting system for insider credit ex-
tensions was lacking even though member banks were required to:
1) file reports'of condition annually with the regulatory agencies,9 5
2) maintain in-house records of insider transactions," and 3) file
reports of extensions of credit to executive officers. 7 In order to
remedy this problem, FIRA and Regulation 0 instituted three re-
forms. First, existing disclosure requirements were reinforced."
Second, reporting requirements on in-house loans to principal
91. A correspondent account is an account which is maintained by a bank with another
bank for the deposit or placement of funds. It does not include time deposits at prevailing
market rates or an account maintained in the ordinary course of business solely for the
purpose of effecting federal funds transactions at prevailing market rates or making
Eurodollar placements at prevailing market rates. 12 C.F.R. § 215.21(c) (1980).
92. Id. § 215.20(b). See 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(G)(i) (Supp. II 1978). A correspondent bank
is defined as any bank "that maintains one or more correspondent accounts from a member
bank during a calendar year that in the aggregate exceeds an average daily balance of
$100,000 or one half of one percent of such member bank's total deposits . . . whichever
amount is smaller." 12 C.F.R. § 215.21(d) (1980). Preferential terms include interest rates.
Compare id. § 215.20(b) with 12 U.S.C. § 376 (1976) (prohibits member banks from paying
directors higher rates of interest on deposits).
93. See Bell & Oliver, Correspondent Bank Loans After the Financial Institutions Reg-
ulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, 34 Bus. LAW. 1347, 1347-51 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Corresponent Bank Loans]. See also The Lance Legacy, supra note 30, at 292.
94. See Bank Insider Abuses, supra note 17, at 812.
95. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a)(3) (Supp. II 1978). Four reports of condition are filed annually
with either the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve Board, or FDIC stating the
amounts of liabilities and assets of the individual bank.
96. Id. § 375a.




shareholders9 were imposed. Third, reports on all correspondent
loans to insiders were required. 10
Member banks must maintain records identifying loans which
they have made to their executive officers and principal sharehold-
ers, stating the amounts and terms of such loans.'01 In view of the
fact that loans to related interests of insiders are included in the
aggregate amount of credit available to executive officers and prin-
cipal shareholders.102 executive officers and principal shareholders
are required to disclose these interests to their bank. 03 In addi-
tion, whenever any executive officer of a member bank exceeds one
of the categorical aggregate lending limits0 4 imposed on him, he is
required to report this fact to the board of directors. 05 Requiring a
bank rather than the individual to report insider loans in excess of
aggregate limits would substantially insure that regulatory agencies
will be informed of such activities. Although these reporting re-
quirements enhance the ability of banks and regulatory agencies to
supervise insider practices, because they are self-reporting require-
ments there is a possibility of inaccuracy. Unless an insider dis-
closes his related interests it is difficult, if not impossible, for a
bank to be accurately informed of its executive officers' and princi-
pal shareholders' related interests.
Under Regulation 0, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board and the FDIC require that member banks and
state insured nonmember banks file a separate report on the aggre-
gate extensions of credit to executive officers and principal share-
holders.106 This report must list all outstanding extensions of
credit to executive officers, principal shareholders, and any of their
99. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a) (Supp. II 1978).
100. Id. § 1972(G).
101. 12 C.F.R. § 215.10(b)(1)-(3) (1980).
102. 12 U.S.C. § 375b (Supp. 1980).
103. 12 C.F.R. § 215.7 (1980).
104. See notes 75-79 supra and accompanying text.
105. 12 C.F.R. § 215.8 (1980). See 12 U.S.C. § 375a(6) (Supp. 1980).
106. 12 C.F.R. § 215.10(b)(2) (1980).
The records of loans to insiders maintained by the individual bank are then filed with
the appropriate regulatory agency, thus incorporating them into a central reporting mecha-
nism. Each member must file, with its report of condition, a report enumerating all exten-
sions of credit granted to any of its executive officers.
Id. § 215.9, .10.
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related interests. 117 Bank regulators must also be supplied with a
list of all principal shareholders and executive officers by name to
whom extensions of credit were granted. 08 This list enables regula-
tors to scrutinize more carefully the practices of an institution by
overseeing which insiders have been granted credit and which have
not. These reports are to be made available to the public upon
request. 0 9
These reports, which must be filed with federal regulatory agen-
cies, serve four functions. First, by requiring member banks to ful-
fill these reporting requirements, banks will closely monitor their
in-house lending practices, and will thereby become more acutely
aware of federal regulations governing insider lending. Second, be-
cause state insured nonmember banks are also required to file
these reports, bank regulators are able to oversee the insider prac-
tices of many more banks and, therefore, bank regulators are able
to prevent as many abusive insider practices as possible. Third, be-
cause these reports are made available to the public, interested
customers of member and insured banks will be able to scrutinize
insider lending. Fourth, these reporting requirements will supply
the regulatory agencies with a factual basis for deciding whether a
particular bank is engaging in insider credit extensions which may
be harmful to the financial security of the bank.
The Federal Reserve Board focusing on a major source of insider
lending abuses also imposed reporting requirements on correspon-
dent bank loans to insiders. 110 Each officer and principal share-
holder of a member bank who becomes indebted to a correspon-
dent bank is required to file annually a report with his bank's
board of directors, stating both the aggregate amount of the in-
debtedness"' and the terms upon which the credit was ex-
107. Id. § 215.10(b)(2).
108. Id. This requirement is applicable to state insured nonmember banks. 12 U.S.C. §§
1817(K)(1)(A), 1817(K)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1978). See also 12 C.F.R. § 304.4 (1980).
109. 12 C.F.R. § 215.10(c) (1980).
110. Id. § 215.22. See Correspondent Bank Loans, supra note 93, at 1354-55; Bank In-
sider Abuses, supra note 17, at 811-12, for a discussion of the need for reporting require-
ments by insiders on correspondent loans. Insiders include in this instance executive officers
and principal shareholders as defined by Regulation 0.
111. For example, this includes the indebtedness to both the individual and his related
interest. 12 C.F.R. § 215.22(b)(2) (1980).
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tended." 2 These reports are not disclosed to the public, unless oth-
erwise directed by the bank regulators. 113 In addition, the Federal
Reserve Board mandates that both member banks and state in-
sured nonmember banks"" must compile reports on all executive
directors and principal shareholders who have been granted corre-
spondent loans. These reports must be filed with the appropriate
regulatory agency" 6 and must state which insiders have been
granted correspondent bank credit extensions and the aggregate
amounts thereof."'
Although directors fall within the confines of regulations gov-
erning correspondent loans to insiders," 7 directors are not required
to comply with the reporting requirements imposed on correspon-
dent loans."' It has been argued that this discrepancy is justified
because directors of member banks owe a high fiduciary duty" 9 to
their own banks, and thus the need for such reports is unnecessary.
However, the opportunity for a director to engage in insider abuses
is present. Thus, in order for bank regulators to adequately super-
vise insider practices, reports on the indebtedness of each insider
whether an executive officer, director, or principal shareholder
should be filed with the appropriate agency. Anything to the con-
trary violates the congressional intent in enacting the FIRA provi-
sions controlling correspondent loans to insiders.
C. Civil Penalties and Criminal Sanctions
The civil penalties imposed on member banks and their officers
and directors for violation of any of the statutes and regulations
governing insider loans are severe. 20 FIRA imposes harsh civil
112. Id. § 215.22(b)(3).
113. Id. § 215.22(d).
114. State insured nonmember banks are banks which are members of the FDIC, but not
members of the Federal Reserve System.
115. Federal bank regulatory agencies include: 1) the Comptroller of the Currency which
supervises national banks; 2) the Federal Reserve Board which supervises state chartered
member banks; and 3) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) which supervises
nonmember insured banks.
116. 12 C.F.R. §§ 215.23(b)(1), .23(b)(2), 349.4(a), .4(b) (1980).
117. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(A) (Supp. II 1978).
118. 12 C.F.R. §§ 215.23, 349.4 (1980). No mention of directors is made in this section on
reports by member banks.
119. 12 U.S.C. § 73 (Supp. 1980).
120. Prior to FIRA, if any director or executive officer violated or permitted any person
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penalties 121 on any director, executive officer, member bank,122 or
state insured nonmember bank which violates 28 any provision gov-
erning extensions of credit to insiders.' 24 The Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC have the
power to fine a director, an executive officer, a member bank, or a
state insured nonmember bank if it has been determined that the
individual or bank has violated a provision governing insider lend-
ing. 125 Upon such a determination the accused is served with a
statement of the charges against him and a penalty is assessed.",
The individual or bank upon assessment has the right to request
an agency hearing to determine the validity of the charges.' 27 An
agency determination of this nature is a final order which may be
reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals. 28 If no hearing is
requested the assessment is a final and unappealable order. 12 9 A
determination made at a hearing will only be set aside on review if
it is found that the charges were unsupported by substantial evi-
dence.'3 0 The Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve
affiliated with the bank to violate any provisions governing extensions of credit to insiders,
he was held personally liable to the bank, its shareholders or any other party injured by the
violation. This provision remains in effect. 12 U.S.C. § 503 (1976).
121. The penalty can be no greater than $1,000 per day for the continuation of the viola-
tion. All penalties are paid to the United States Treasury. Id. § 504(a)-(g) (Supp. H 1978).
122. Only Federal Reserve member banks are governed by these provisions. Id. § 504.
See also 12 C.F.R. § 215.11 (1980).
123. The term "violates" includes "any action . . . for or towards causing, bringing
about, participating in, counseling, or aiding or abetting a violation." 12 U.S.C. § 504(a)
(Supp. II 1978).
124. Id. See 12 C.F.R. § 215.11 (1980).
125. 12 U.S.C. §§ 504(a), 1828(j)(3)(A) (Supp. H 1978).
126. Id.
127. Id. §§ 504(c), 1828(j)(3)(C) (Supp. II 1978). Request for a hearing must be made by
the bank or person assessed within ten days of the assessment. All issues in the hearing will
be determined pursuant to Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, Sept. 6, 1966,
80 Stat. 384, as amended, Pub. L. No. 95-251, Mar. 27, 1978, 92 Stat. 183 (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 554 (Supp. H 1978)).
128. 12 U.S.C. §§ 504(d), 18280)(3)(D) (Supp. H 1978). Any hearing determination may
be reviewed in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the home office of
the member bank is located or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. The petitioner must file a notice of appeal within ten days from the date of the
hearing order and send a copy of the notice to the approprate regulatory agency, which must
certify and file in such court the record from the hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2112
(1976).
129. 12 U.S.C. §§ 504(c), 1828(j)(3)(C) (Supp. 11 1978).
130. Id. §§ 504(c), 1828(j)(3)(D). See also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706
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Bank or the FDIC has the authority to take the past history and
good faith service of the bank or individuals into account when
imposing a penalty.18'
In addition to the civil sanctions imposed on violators, the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Bank, and the
FDIC are authorized to order a bank, its directors, or executive
officers to cease and desist from engaging in activities found to vio-
late federal lending regulations or to constitute unsafe and un-
sound bank practices.'3 2 Prior to the issuance of a cease and desist
order, the offending bank is served with a summons stating all the
charges against it. 33 The summons must specify a time and place
for an agency hearing to determine the validity of the charges and
whether an order should be issued. 3 4 Unless the party charged ap-
pears at the agency hearing, he is deemed to have consented to the
order. 3 5 The agency determination at a hearing is a final and ap-
pealable order which may be reviewed by the United States Court
of Appeals.'
If the regulatory agency believes immediate action must be
taken to prevent a bank from continuing to engage in a violation or
threatened violation which may cause insolvency or a dissipation of
bank funds,1 7 a temporary cease and desist order may be issued.13 8
This order will become effective immediately upon service of no-
tice and will remain in effect until an agency hearing convened to
investigate the charges determines otherwise. 9 Whenever a tem-
porary cease and desist order is issued, the individual or bank
(1976).
131. 12 U.S.C. §§ 504(b), 1828(j)(3)(B) (Supp. II 1978). Factors to be considered include:
1) the financial size of the institution, 2) good faith of the bank or person charged, 3) gravity
of the violation and 4) such other matters as justice may require. Id.
132. Id. § 1818(b)(1). Unsafe bank practices include violations of the banking laws and
regulations. Id.
133. Id. The summons shall fix a time and place for an agency hearing to determine
whether a cease and desist order should be issued.
134. Id. The hearing shall commence within 30 to 60 days after notice is issued or at
such time as the agency may determine at the request of a charged party. An individual or
bank given notice will be deemed to consent to a cease and desist order, unless such party
appears personally or by a duly authorized representative at the hearing. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. § 1818(b)(2).
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served has the right to petition the United States Court of Ap-
peals"04 for an injunction limiting, modifying, or suspending the or-
der until the agency proceedings are completed.
141
In addition to cease and desist orders, any officer or director of a
member bank or a state-insured nonmember bank may be sus-
pended from office or removed if the appropriate federal agency
determines that the individual has engaged in or is participating in
any unsafe practices. 1 2 For example, these practices include, but
are not limited to: 1) breach of fiduciary duty; 2) violation of the
banking laws; 3) financial gain at the expense of the bank; or 4)
jeopardizing the financial security of the bank." Prior to removal
or suspension the individual is given notice14" and is afforded the
opportunity to have an agency hearing, 45 which is subject to judi-
cial review."
e
These supervisory powers not only enable bank regulators to
scrutinize the practices of all insured banks, but also empower
them to take immediate action against those banks, executive of-
ficers, or directors who threaten the financial stability of a bank. In
part, the mandatory reporting requirements on loans to executive
officers and principal shareholders afford the regulatory agencies a
factual basis for deciding whether a particular bank is engaging in
insider credit extensions which may be harmful to its financial
security.
Bank officers and directors may be subject to criminal prosecu-
tion if they willfully misapply the monies of their bank.
1 47 Willful
140. Id. § 1818(c)(2). The person or bank served has the right to petition the United
States District Court in the judicial district where the home office of the bank is located or
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
141. Id.
142. Id. § 1818(e)(1)-(2).
143. Id.
144. Id. § 1818(e)(4). The notice shall set forth the facts which constitute the grounds
for removal or suspension and shall fix a date and place at which a hearing will be sched-
uled. Id.
145. Id. A hearing shall be scheduled within 30 to 60 days after issuance of notice, unless
an alternate date is fixed by the appropriate agency at the request of the United States
Attorney General or director, officer of individual charged. Unless the individual charged
appears personally or by a duly authorized representative at the hearing, he is deemed to
have consented to the order for removal or suspension. Id.
146. Id. § 1818(f). See note 140 supra and accompanying text.
147. 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1976) (theft, embezzlement or misapplication by bank officer or
employee). A convicted individual shall not be fined more than five thousand dollars, nor
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misapplication of bank funds includes both in-house loans to insid-
ers in excess of the statutory limitations "1 8 and correspondent pref-
erential loans. 1 Although proof of intent to defraud the bank is
the degree of malice necessary for a successful prosecution, 150
courts have found the requisite intent in the fact that an officer or
director has knowingly violated a provision of the banking law. 51
The federal government has been reluctant to prosecute bank
insiders who have engaged in lending abuses in the past, unless
such abuses threaten the financial security of a bank. 52 This prac-
tice is evidenced by the relatively small number of insider abuses
which have been prosecuted in recent years. The failure of prose-
cutors to vigorously enforce criminal sanctions has undermined the
deterrent value of these sanctions. Despite the lack of criminal
prosecutions, the fines, cease and desist orders and the suspension
or removal powers vested in the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Federal Reserve Board, and the FDIC, as now added by FIRA,
provide sufficient enforcement authority to sanction those banks
and insiders who violate insider lending regulations.'
III. State Regulation
Although the majority of state chartered banks are either mem-
ber banks'54 or are insured 5 by the FDIC and, therefore, subject
to some federal regulation, most states have enacted specific laws
imprisoned more than five years for such violation unless the amount involved is less than
one hundred dollars, in which case the fine shall not exceed one thousand dollars, nor im-
prisonment exceed one year. Id.
148. See United States v. Christo, 614 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1980). The defendant, an officer
of the bank, had overdrawn his account in excess of $81,000, thus violating 12 U.S.C. § 375a
(Supp. II 1978).
149. See United States v. Larson, 581 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Mann,
517 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); United States v. Brookshire,
514 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1975). In Larson, Mann and Brookshire bank insiders were con-
victed of misapplying bank monies by maintaining a compensating balance of bank funds in
a non-interest bearing account at a bank in order to obtain preferential loans.
150. See United States v. Riley, 550 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Mann, 517 F.2d 259, 267 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976).
151. See United States v. Christo, 614 F.2d 486, 492-94 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Larson, 581 F.2d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1978).
152. See generally Bank Insider Abuses, supra note 17, at 812.
153. Id. at 814-16.
154. See note 14 supra for a definition of member bank.
155. See note 114 supra for a definition of insured bank.
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governing extensions of credit to insiders. For example, the New
York State Banking Law"I contains a detailed regulatory scheme
for controlling insider credit extensions.
As a general rule all officers, directors and trustees of New York
chartered banks are required to fulfill their duties in good faith
and with that degree of care, prudence and skill which careful men
in like positions would exercise. 157 In performing his duty each di-
rector, officer or trustee of a state chartered bank must comply
with the restrictions imposed on insider extensions of credit. The
nature of the restrictions imposed on insider lending is dependent
upon the type of banking institution involved. The three primary
banking institutions which operate in New York1" include: banks
and trust companies, "59 savings banks, 60 and savings and loan
associations.1 61
A. Scope of Control
The New York definitions of the terms "insider" and "extension
of credit" mirror those contained in Regulation O.12 Under New
York law the term "insider" includes: 1) any director or trustee of
a bank;1 " 2) any officer or employee of a bank who has the author-
ity or participates in the major policymaking functions of the
bank; 64 3) the chairman of the board, president, executive vice
president, secretary and treasurer of a bank;' 65 and 4) any person
who has direct or indirect control over the voting power of ten per-
cent of the stock of the bank, or otherwise controls the manage-
ment or policies of the bank.1" New York laws include the major-
ity of those individuals defined as insiders under federal law.167
156. N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 1-9018 (McKinney 1976).
157. Id. §§ 257(1), 398-b(1). Cf. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1976).
158. Credit unions and industrial banks although governed by the New York Banking
Law will not be discussed in this Note.
159. N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 90-140a (McKinney 1976).
160. Id. §§ 229-260b.
161. Id. §§ 375-411.
162. See notes 38-61 supra and accompanying text.
163. [1976] 3 N.Y.C.R.R. § 11.1(e)(3).
164. Id. § 11.1(e)(2). See [1970] 3 N.Y.C.R.R. § 321.1(b) for a definition of executive
director.
165. Id. § 11.1(e)(1).
166. Id. § 11.1(e)(4).
167. See notes 38-61 supra and accompanying text.
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Extensions of credit include any transactions whereby an individ-
ual becomes obligated to or renews an obligation to pay any mone-
tary obligation to a bank whether in the form of a note, bill of
exchange, draft or any other means of indebtness.' 6 This defini-
tion encompasses the same monetary transactions as are included
in the federal definition of extension of credit.16"
B. General Restrictions
In New York extensions of credit to officers, directors or trustees
of any of the state's banking institutions are strictly limited by
statute.'7 0 Banks and trust companies are prohibited from ex-
tending credit to any of their executive officers or directors, unless
the extension of credit is granted after either specific written ap-
proval of a majority of the board of directors, 7  or is made pursu-
ant to a resolution of a majority of the board.'7M No extension of
credit may be made on preferential terms.'17 Any extension of
credit made pursuant to a board resolution must be reported to
the Superintendent of Banks.' 7 4 In addition, any extension of
credit made to an insider shall be combined with all other out-
standing extensions of credit to the insider or a relative or a re-
lated interest.'75 This aggregation of credit prevents insiders from
obtaining credit extensions in excess of specific monetary
limitations.
168. [1970] 3 N.Y.C.R.R. § 321.2(a)(1).
169. See notes 52-61 supra and accompanying text.
170. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 103(8) (McKinney 1976).
171. Id. See also [1976] 3 N.Y.C.R.R. § 11.3(a)(1)-(4).
172. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 103(8) (McKinney 1976). The board of directors may by reso-
lution permit a bank to extend credit to an officer or individual director stating the maxi-
mum amount thereof based upon his financial record, three months prior to such extension.
Id.
173. Id. § 130(2).
174. Id. § 103(8).
175. [1976] 3 N.Y.C.R.R. § 11.4. The lending limitations are as follows: 1) $20,000 or
one-half of one percent of the net worth of the bank, whichever is less, if the total assets of
the bank are $100,000,000 or less; 2) $50,000 or one-half of one percent of the net worth of
the bank, whichever is less, if the total assets of the bank are more than $100,000,000 and
not more than $500,000,000; 3) $100,000 or one-half of one percent of the net worth of the
bank, whichever is less, if the total assets of the bank are more than $500,000,000 and not
more than $1,000,000,000; and 4) one-half of one percent of the net worth of the bank if the
total assets of the bank are more than $1,000,000,000. Id. § 11.3(a)(1)-(4).
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Officers and trustees 76 of savings banks are prohibited from bor-
rowing money, either directly or indirectly, from their bank.'" In
addition, each is prohibited from becoming the owner of a piece of
real property on which the savings bank holds a mortgage.17 8 Di-
rectors and officers of savings and loan associations are also pro-
hibited from borrowing money from their institution for either
themselves or their related interests, unless the funds are secured
by their shares in the savings and loan association, or secured by
real estate owned and used by the director or officer as a
residence. 17 9
The limitations imposed on credit extensions to insiders under
New York law are very similar to those imposed by federal legisla-
tion. First, each mandates that extensions of credit be made on
substantially the same terms as those available to the public. 80
Second, both New York and federal legislation aggregate exten-
sions of credit to the insider with those to his related interests.' 8'
Third, both require that loans in excess of certain dollar amounts
secure prior approval of the board of directors before issuance.
Although these similarities are important, federal regulation pro-
vides a more detailed scheme of control over insider lending prac-
tices. This is manifested particularly in the limitations on over-
drafts and correspondent loans to insiders 8" which are unique to
federal regulation.
C. Reporting Requirements
All banks are required to maintain detailed records of all insider
extensions of credit which demand board approval. 8 4 These
records must include all relevant facts which supported the board's
decision, including, but not limited to: 1) the name of the insider;
2) his relationship to the bank; '3) the date of the loan; 4) the type
176. A trustee is a member of a savings banks' board of directors. N.Y. BANKING LAW §
257 (McKinney 1978).
177. Id. § 247(d).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 399(3).
180. See notes 65, 173 supra and accompanying text.
181. See notes 73, 171 supra and accompanying text.
182. See notes 71, 175 supra and accompanying text.
183. See notes 83-93 supra and accompanying text.
184. [1976] 3 N.Y.C.R.R. § 11.5(a).
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of credit extended; and 5) the terms thereof.'8' These records are
reviewed by bank examiners of the Superintendent's office.' 8
All boards of directors of banks and trust companies must ex-
amine all extensions of credit to insiders. 87 If a director is in-
debted to his own bank, he must annually file a financial statement
with the bank.1 88 Executive officers who become indebted to banks
other than their employer bank, must report this indebtedness to
the board of directors of their employer bank.1 '" All banks and
trust companies must include in their report of condition to the
Superintendent of Banks a detailed explanation of all extensions of
credit to executive officers and directors. 90 Failure to file this re-
port results in severe civil penalties. 191 In addition, the Superinten-
dent of Banks has the power to investigate these institutions at
least annually, or whenever necessary. 92 This investigative power
affords the Superintendent the opportunity to oversee any insider
abuses, and to take appropriate remedial measures where
necessary.
Although the reporting requirements imposed by the New York
Banking Law closely resemble those on the federal level, the New
York regulations additionally require banks and trust companies to
report to the Superintendent extensions of credit made not only to
executive officers,' 3 but also extensions of credit made to direc-
tors.19 Whereas Regulation 0 fails to require the filing of reports
respecting loans to directors, Regulation 0 does require that re-
ports of extensions of credit to principal shareholders be filed.1 95
This requirement is not imposed under New York law.196
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 122 (McKinney 1976).
188. Id. § 130(5). This does not apply to directors whose loans are secured by collateral
having a value of at least 15% greater than the amount of the credit extension.
189. Id. § 122.
190. Id.
191. Id. § 123.
192. Id. §§ 36(1)-(2).
193. See notes 189-90 supra and accompanying text.
194. See notes 188, 190 supra and accompanying text.
195. See notes 99-109 supra and accompanying text.
196. See notes 184-86 supra and accompanying text.
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The civil penalties and criminal sanctions imposed on directors,
officers and trustees of state chartered banks for violations of New
York law are similar to those imposed under federal law.197 First,
any bank or trust company or one of its executive officers, or direc-
tors that permits insider extensions of credit in excess of the statu-
tory limitations, may be required to forfeit up to twice the value of
that loan as a penalty.' 8 Second, the Superintendent, through a
vote of the banking board, has the power to remove any director,
officer or trustee from office who he believes has violated one of the
banking laws or regulations, or has engaged in unsafe bank prac-
tices."' Third, after serving notice and conducting a he~ring, the
Superintendent has the authority to impose a penalty not in excess
of $5,000 on any bank institution which is found to have violated a
banking law. 00
Any officer or employee of a banking institution who intention-
ally overdraws his account and obtains money therefrom is guilty
of a misdemeanor. 20' In addition, any director, officer or trustee of
a banking institution who attempts to maintain an account with
another bank for the sole purpose of obtaining preferential loans
for himself is guilty of a misdemeanor.20 2 Any director who obtains
a loan over and above the statutory limits is also guilty of a misde-
meanor in New York. 203
The New York Banking Law establishes a regulatory framework
governing extensions of credit to insiders which is similar to fed-
eral regulation. Although the New York laws are not as restrictive
as federal regulations, New York requires all state chartered banks
to become members of a federal insurance corporation.0 4 Thus, all
New York nonmember banks are subject to federal regulation to
197. See notes 120-53 supra and accompanying text.
198. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 103(5) (McKinney 1976).
199. Id. § 41 (McKinney 1976). See notes 142-46 supra and accompanying text for a
discussion of the applicable federal law.
200. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 44 (McKinney Supp. 1979). See notes 120-31 supra and ac-
companying text.
201. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 662 (McKinney 1976).
202. Id. § 660 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
203. Id.
204. Id. § 32 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
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the extent that they must comply with reporting requirements0 5
and are governed by the broad enforcement powers of the FDIC.2 0 6
This additional regulation will help prevent the insider abuses in
New York which were prevalent in state nonmember banks prior
to FIRA.20
IV. Conclusion
Although the majority of bank insiders are honest and prudent
individuals who fulfill their duties in good faith, participation in
abusive insider lending practices is a reality in the banking indus-
try.208 Because excessive and unregulated insider loans can severely
upset the financial security of a bank and possibly lead to its fail-
ure, 2 9 strict limitations and regulation of insider credit extensions
are necessary to insure a safe banking industry.
Although the numerous federal and state statutes and regula-
tions governing insider credit extensions appear at first glance to
restrict many facets of insider credit transactions, an analysis of
these provisions demonstrates that certain insiders still possess the
ability to obtain extensions of credit in what may be excessive
amounts and to a large extent in an unregulated manner. Direc-
tors, executive officers and principal shareholders are each regu-
lated differently under FIRA and Regulation 0. Executive officers
of member banks are strictly regulated, 10 whereas directors and
principal shareholders are relatively free from restrictions.2 1' Be-
cause the lending limitations and reporting requirements imposed
on extensions of credit to directors, executive officers and principal
shareholders are not regulated equally, many of the abuses Con-
gress sought to remedy may be statutorily sanctioned by virtue of
these discrepancies. These discrepancies leave open the door to po-
tential insider abuses, although the majority of banks are currently
more strictly regulated than during the pre-FIRA era insofar as
lending limitations, reporting requirements and civil penalties are
concerned. Banks still retain broad discretion in extending credit
205. See notes 114-16 supra and accompanying text.
206. See notes 132-46 supra and accompanying text.
207. See notes 8, 13, 15 supra and accompanying text.
208. [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 2, at 9331-32.
209. See notes 12, 13, 19 supra and accompanying text.
210. See notes 67, 68, 76-80 supra and accompanying text.
211. See notes 71-82 supra and accompanying text.
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to certain insiders, particularly principal shareholders and direc-
tors. This discretion may continue to foster insider abuses. If the
intent in enacting FIRA and the issuance of Regulation 0 was to
bring all potentially harmful insiders within the ambit of strict reg-
ulatory control, 1" then the limitations or extensions of credit to all
insiders, including executive officers, directors and principle share-
holders should promote more parity and fewer exceptions.
Patricia A. Murphy
212. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
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